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Summary: There is much evidence to suggest that economic and 
social factors are major causes of civil unrest. However, govern-
ments often resort to the use of police and military to tackle such 
upheavals, rather than using policies that directly address the 
causes of discontent. This brieﬁng uses data from India to com-
pare the effectiveness of redistributive transfers and policing in 
reducing conﬂict. It ﬁnds that transfers have a signiﬁcant effect 
on the prevention and reduction of civil unrest, particularly in the 
medium term. While policing reduces conﬂict in the short term, 
the continued use of police has either inconsequential effects, 
or even leads to increases in rioting. These ﬁndings have im-
portant lessons for other countries where social cohesion breaks 
frequently, but large-scale conﬂict may be avoidable.
•How can policymakers re-
duce and prevent civil unrest 
in highly unequal societies? 
•What are the medium 
term effects of redistribu-
tive transfers on unrest, 
compared to policing?
1. Introduction
Whilst there is a large academic lit-
erature on the causes of civil con-
ﬂict, it does not offer much policy 
application in terms of what can be 
done to prevent the onset of conﬂict 
episodes.  It  also  focuses  mainly 
on  large-scale  civil  wars,  which 
neglects  the  destructive  nature  of 
more localised conﬂicts and social 
upheavals, which can often consti-
tute the preliminary stages of more 
violent conﬂicts.
There  is  much  evidence  to  sug-
gest that economic and social fac-
tors contribute largely to the onset 
of civil unrest. Nevertheless many 
governments  tend  to  resort  to  the 
use of police and military forces to 
tackle  civil  and  political  upheav-
als. This can be counterproductive 
as it does not address the causes of 
unrest  when  population  mobilisa-
tion  is  rooted  in  perceived  forms 
of social injustice. In addition, the 
continued use of coercive force by 
security  forces  may  cause  resent-
ment and further mobilisation that 
can increase the risk of the escala-
tion of unrest.
Policies  that  directly  address  the 
causes of social discontent are like-
ly to be more effective. They have 
been used in Europe since the ﬁrst 
social  insurance  systems  imple-
mented at the end of the 19th Centu-
ry, starting in Bismarckʼs Germany 
in 1880. Such programmes were a 
response to demands from workers 
movements fomented by the Indus-
trial Revolution, and were seen as 
a way to keep class struggle under 
control.
Theoretical models have highlight-
ed the importance of contemporary 
social  policies  and  redistributive 
transfers in ending and/or prevent-
ing  civil  wars.  However,  little  is 
known empirically about their im-
pact on conﬂict, how different types 
of civil unrest respond to such poli-
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work in Mumbai © Jaideep Gupte-cies,  and  how  effective  they  are 
in  relation  to  the  use  of  security 
forces.  This  brieﬁng  seeks  to  ad-
dress this gap by comparing the use 
of redistributive transfers to the use 
of police as a tool for reducing civil 
unrest. 
The term ʻredistributive transfersʼ is 
used here to refer to transfers that 
beneﬁt those in need without dis-
torting  private investment decisions 
and harming economic growth. Such 
policies shift income from the rich, 
or  the  whole  population,  into  the 
accumulation of wealth and human 
capital  by  the  poor.  These  might 
include programmes of public em-
ployment, investment in basic edu-
cation and primary health care, food 
security programmes and so on.
2. Inequality and unrest
In unequal, highly polarised socie-
ties in social, economic and political 
terms there is often a small elite that 
is to be found amongst the better-
off strata of society and in the state 
apparatus.  The  remaining  popula-
tion is often characterised by lim-
ited access to social, economic and 
political opportunities. Inequalities 
between the two groups that result 
from  differences  in  access  to  op-
portunities lead to social discontent 
amongst  the  disadvantaged,  and 
consequently  to  conﬂicts  between 
the two groups.
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The use of coercive means to quell unrest can cause discon-
tent amongst disadvantaged populations
taged populations, leading to con-
ﬂict.  This  propensity  to  resort  to 
violence might also be affected by 
a populationʼs ʻinequality aversionʼ 
– if they are highly averse to ine-
quality existing in society, this can 
make unrest more likely.
In  a  well-functioning  democracy 
or an efﬁcient dictatorship it may 
not matter whether the elite group 
uses policing or transfers to reduce 
conﬂict. In a democracy, everyone 
votes  over  the  optimal  levels  of 
taxation – therefore the higher the 
level  of  inequality,  the  higher  the 
preference of the average voter for 
taxation. In a dictatorship, those at 
the top will be powerful enough to 
exclude other groups from any deci-
sion-making process. Consequently, 
only a minimum level of transfers 
will take place.
However,  in  many  developing 
countries that are neither high-func-
tioning  democracies  nor  efﬁcient 
dictatorship regimes the only way 
to decrease conﬂict in the long term 
is to reduce inequality. Elites must 
take  into  account  that  disadvan-
taged groups may be able to engage 
in conﬂicts and therefore have bar-
gaining power in the decision-mak-
ing process. By instigating unrest, 
these groups are thus able to inﬂu-
ence the welfare of elites, through 
destroying property, increasing in-
The dominant group has to choose 
how  to  manage  the  conﬂict  using 
ʻstick  or  carrotʼ.  Policy-makers 
tend to resort to the use of police 
or military force to offset episodes 
of unrest, rather than redistributive 
transfers which directly address the 
causes of social discontent. 
The use of coercive means to quell 
unrest may be effective in the short 
term,  but  in  the  long  term  it  can 
cause discontent amongst disadvan-
vestment  risks  or  directly  affect-
ing the lives of elites in other ways. 
This interdependency often results 
in redistribution.
In  the  absence  of  systems  of  re-
distribution,  the  immediate  use  of 
police has to be very large or very 
efﬁcient. If the elite group has little 
to lose and can sustain indeﬁnitely 
high levels of repression, then this 
strategy  may  be  feasible.  Sustain-
able increases in policing will rely 
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on a number of factors including the 
economyʼs  potential  to  attract  na-
tional and international investment, 
its endowment in natural resources 
or on how mobile capital is (which 
allows elites to send capital abroad 
and avoid the costs of conﬂict). Once 
policing is no longer affordable, ei-
ther the elite compromises and sets 
a system of transfers in place, or un-
rest will become unmanageable and 
widespread ﬁghting, and potentially 
war, may erupt.
3. Policing and transfers in India
India  is  in  a  similar  situation  to 
many societies in the world, which 
are prone to civil unrest but are not 
(yet)  affected  by  widespread  con-
ﬂict.  There  have  often  been  con-
ﬂicts between Indiaʼs diverse reli-
gious,  social  and  political  groups, 
but despite this violence there has 
not been widespread ﬁghting. India 
has a strong police force, but also 
a well-functioning democratic sys-
tem that responds fairly effectively 
to demands by its different groups.
An important institutional form of 
conﬂict management is the federal 
system of government. India is di-vided into 25 states, each roughly 
representing  one  dominant  ethno-
linguistic  group.  Although  such 
groups  are  divided  into  different 
castes and religions, federalism al-
lows  the  compartmentalisation  of 
conﬂicts in contained borders, and 
they rarely spill into neighbouring 
states. 
The electoral system also makes a 
positive contribution, as ethnic and 
regional conﬂicts tend to ease when 
leaders deal with them by accom-
modating  demands  from  different 
factions,  and  use  their  bargaining 
power within the democratic proc-
ess.
As with any other country, the In-
dian  government  often  intervenes 
in the mediation and resolution of 
conﬂicts with a mix of ʻcarrotʼ and 
ʻstickʼ approaches – with redistribu-
tive transfers and policing.
4. Empirical analysis
By  looking  at  published  data  on 
the use of police and transfers be-
tween 1973 and 1999 in 14 Indian 
states, we can get an empirical feel 
for these mechanisms. Table 1 re-
ports the coefﬁcients of correlation 
between, respectively, transfers and 
rioting, and the use of police and 
rioting.  The  variable  for  transfers 
includes the annual expenditure per 
capita in education; medical, pub-
lic health and family welfare; wel-
fare of scheduled castes, tribes and 
ʻother  backward  classesʼ;  labour 
welfare; social security and welfare; 
and nutrition. 
This  descriptive  look  at  the  data 
shows that the use of police is weak-
ly  correlated  with  the  occurrence 
of riots in India, particularly in the 
longer term. Transfers seem to have 
a more signiﬁcant impact on the re-
duction of unrest across states. The 
correlation is almost always nega-
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tive and statistically signiﬁcant.
An analytical approach to this data 
is more revealing. Such an approach 
controls for a range of other factors 
that have been shown to contribute 
to the onset of conﬂict. These in-
clude the extent of poverty in the 
country  and  across  groups,  look-
ing at both aggregate poverty levels 
and poverty levels disaggregated by 
urban and rural areas; the level of 
overall state income; and the level 
of  education  in  each  state.  In  our 
analysis,  two  national-level  vari-
ables were also included: ﬁrstly, the 
openness  of  the  Indian  economy. 
This was included as economic lib-
eralisation has been put forward as a 
potential cause of civil unrest, since 
it may result in some groups ben-
eﬁting while others become worse 
off. Secondly, the effects of political 
institutions on conﬂict was included 
–  civil  unrest  may  be  affected  by 
how well or how badly social and 
political institutions operate.
The  results  of  econometric  mod-
elling  that  takes  account  of  these 
factors shows that higher levels of 
redistributive  transfers  are  associ-
ated with decreases in civil unrest 
across India. This effect is particu-
larly  signiﬁcant  in  the  long-term: 
the number of riots decrease by 0.3-
0.4% for each extra rupee per capita 
spent on social services in the same 
period, but by 10.5-12.1% for every 
extra rupee per capita spent on so-
cial services in preceding period.
Policing is also found to decrease 
civil unrest in the same period that it 
is used. However the use of policing 
tends to increase civil unrest in sub-
sequent  periods.  Our  calculations 
show that on average across the 14 
states, India needs to hire 20 more 
policemen in order to have one less 
riot per year. Conversely, every ad-
ditional 25 policemen used in each 
period will result in one additional 
riot ﬁve years later.
The average entry salary for a police 
ofﬁcer in India in 2004 was around 
Rs.  8000  per  month.  This  makes 
policing a rather expensive way of 
dealing with riots. The ʻrepression
Correlation Coefﬁcients for Rioting in India 1973 - 1999
Transfers lagged by one period Police same period Police lagged by 
one period
Andhra Pradesh -0.884*** -0.634** -0.409*
Assam -0.766*** -0.507* -0.270
Bihar -0.464*** -0.179 -0.215
Gujarat -0.053 -0.467** 0.487***
Karnataka -0.556** -0.173 -0.295
Kerala 0.215 -0.593** 0.288
Madhya Pradesh -0.771** -0.065 -0.461**
Maharashtra -0.026 -0.214 -0.345
Orissa -0.775*** -0.049 -0.067
Punjab -0.413** -0.543** -0.746***
Rajasthan -0.001 -0.883*** -0.039
Tamil Nadu -0.655*** -0.408* -0.359
Uttar Pradesh -0.976*** 0.435** 0.503*
West Bengal -0.958*** 0.244 0.285
India -0.457*** -0.205 -0.150
Table 1
Source: Justino 2007
Note: ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 
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thresholdʼ we witness here may be 
partially due to the heavy-handed-
ness of policing at times.
5. Conclusion
These results suggest that the level 
of redistributive transfers across In-
dia has been sufﬁcient to avoid the 
escalation of civil unrest. Whether 
intentional or not, and despite the 
small amounts spent, transfers have 
had a signiﬁcant impact on the pre-
vention and reduction of civil unrest 
in India, particularly in the medium 
term. The use of police is less suc-
cessful and more costly. While it re-
duces conﬂict in the short term, the 
continued use of police has either 
inconsequential effects on civil un-
rest or is associated with increases 
in rioting.
The results of this analysis yield im-
portant lessons for other countries 
where social cohesion tends to break 
frequently but large-scale wars may 
be  avoidable.  Some  countries  in 
Latin America, such as Brazil, Mex-
ico and Peru, have exhibited a com-
bination of high income inequalities 
(much higher than Indiaʼs) and high 
potential for socio-political conﬂict, 
while  other  countries  have  shown 
signs of deterioration of previously 
successful social development poli-
cies  (for  instance,  former  Soviet 
Union  republics).  This  can  result 
in increases in civil unrest. The im-
plementation of adequate programs 
of redistributive transfers may have 
an important role to play in the es-
tablishment and/or maintenance of 
stable socio-political environments 
in those countries.
Endnotes
1. For more detail on this empirical anal-
ysis see Justino, P. 2007. Carrot or Stick: 
Redistributive  transfers  versus  policing 
in  contexts  of  civil  unrest.  MICROCON 
Research Working Paper 3, Brighton: MI-
CROCON
Credits
This Policy Brieﬁng was written by Patricia Justino, MICROCON Direc-
tor, Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, and 
Visiting Fellow at the Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs, Har-
vard University.
The views expressed in this brieﬁng are the authorʼs alone.
Further reading
Azam, J-P., 2001. The Redistributive State and Conﬂicts in Africa, Journal 
of Peace Research, 38:429-444
Justino, P. 2007. ʻCarrot or Stick: Redistributive transfers versus policing 
in contexts of civil unrestʼ. MICROCON Research Working Paper 3
http://www.microconﬂict.eu/publications/RWP3_PJ.pdf 
Midlarsky, M.I., 1988. ʻRulers and the ruled: patterned inequality and the 
onset of mass political violenceʼ. American Political Science Review 82, 
491-509
Muller, E.N., 1985. Income inequality, regime repressiveness, and political 
violence. American Sociological Review 50, 47-61.
MICROCON, or ʻA Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conﬂictʼ is a ﬁve-year research 
programme funded by the European Commission, which takes an innovative micro level, 
multidisciplinary approach to the study of the conﬂict cycle.
Almost one third of the worldʼs population lives in conﬂict-affected low-income coun-
tries. At a fundamental level, conﬂict originates from peopleʼs behaviour and how they 
interact with society and their environment - from its ʻmicroʼ foundations. Yet most con-
ﬂict research and policy focuses on ʻmacroʼ perspectives. MICROCON seeks to redress 
this balance.
For more information on MICROCON, please visit our website:
http://www.microconﬂict.eu
Or contact us at
MICROCON - A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conﬂict
Institute of Development Studies
Brighton BN1 9RE, UK
Tel: +44 (0)1273 872 891
© Copyright Patricia Justino 2008
ISSN 1757-238X